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Summary
It is argued that the meaning of Russian dative refl exive constructions, i.e. constructions of the type 
Ivanu ne rabotaetsja ‘Ivan does not feel like working’, is compositional. It is shown that the refl exive 
marker -sja in general signals reduced agentivity and/or increased patientivity of the subject. One 
of the possible particular construals of -sja is ‘the subject’s volitionality is decreased’. For reasons 
explained in the paper, purely “quantitative” reduction (‘the subject is less willing to carry out the 
action, and/or has less inner resources necessary for the action’) is improbable, which forces the 
speakers to look for other circumstances reducing the subject’s responsibility for the action. Th is is 
an easy task, since, on the one hand, one may always believe that the subject’s desires and/or inner 
resources are due to an external irrational force acting upon the subject, and, on the other hand, 
we tend to speak of such a force only where the action is indeed carried out, which attenuates the 
responsibility of the subject. As far as the subject in dative refl exive constructions stops to be the 
initial point in the relevant causal chain and becomes in some sense a benefi ciary, the nominative-
dative shift in its morphology is only the side eff ect of non-refl exive-to-refl exive transformation. 
Th us, both the meaning of dative refl exive constructions and their form turn out to be predictable 
from the general meaning of the refl exive marker -sja.
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compositionality
Streszczenie
Rosyjskie celownikowe konstrukcje zwrotne: Przypadkowe czy kompozycyjne?
W artykule wykazuje się, że znaczenie celownikowej konstrukcji zwrotnej, jak np. Ivanu ne rabotaetsja 
‘Janowi się nie pracuje’, jest kompozycyjne. Zademonstrowano, że na ogół wykładnik zwrotności 
-sja wskazuje na obniżoną agentywność i/lub na podwyższoną pacjentywność subiekta. Jedna 
z możliwych interpretacji -sja polega na tym, że obniżona jest wolitywność subiekta. Z powodów, 
które zostały szczegółowo wytłumaczone, ściśle „ilościowa” redukcja (‘subiekt ma mniej chęci do 
wykonania czynności i/lub mniej resursów wewnętrznych’) jest mało prawdopodobna, i to zmusza 
do szukania innych okoliczności zmniejszających odpowiedzialność subiekta. Znalezienie tych 
okoliczności jest łatwe, ponieważ z jednej strony zawsze możemy uważać, iż chęci i/lub resursy 
wewnętrzne subiekta istnieją dzięki działaniu na tego ostatniego zewnętrznej irracjonalnej siły, 
z innej zaś strony wyobrażamy sobie taką silę przeważnie wtedy, gdy czynność zostaje rzeczywi-
ście wykonana, i ta ostatnia okoliczność zmniejsza odpowiedzialność subiekta. Ponieważ subiekt 
rozpatrywanych konstrukcji przestaje być punktem wyjściowym w odpowiednim łańcuchu przy-
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czynowo-skutkowym i nabiera cech benefi cjenta, zmiana przypadku z mianownika na celownik 
okazuje się skutkiem ubocznym refl eksywizacji. Tak znaczenie rozpatrywanych konstrukcji, jak też 
ich forma okazują się pochodne od znaczenia ogólnego morfemu -sja.
Słowa klucze:
język rosyjski, celownikowa konstrukcja zwrotna, wykładnik zwrotności, agentywność, pacjentyw-
ność, wolitywność, kompozycyjność
1. The problem
I will discuss Russian impersonal dative refl exive constructions (henceforth DRC) 
of the type of Ivanu ploxo čitaetsja ‘Ivan does not feel like reading’, lit. ‘to Ivan badly 
reads itself ’. Only those cases are taken into account where this construction cor-
relates with a personal one, as Ivan čitaet ‘Ivan reads’, since, as it will be clear below, 
the most prominent properties of DRC are due to its derivability from the personal 
construction.
DRC has been extensively discussed in the literature (cf. e.g., Wierzbicka 1981; 
Gerritsen 1990; Israeli 1997; Ackerman, Moore 2001; Pariser 1982, where the 19th 
century works are summarized), nevertheless it remains ill-understood. Th us, to the 
best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made to render a fully compositional 
account of DRC. On the other hand, such an account is strongly preferable over 
a non-compositional one both in theoretical and practical terms, all the more so as 
the main properties of DRC are the same in many languages, such as Russian, Polish, 
German, Spanish, etc. Th us, it is tempting to explain the meaning of DRC as a direct 
result of the appearance of refl exive marker and the nominative-to-dative change in 
the case morphology of the subject.
It is generally agreed upon that DRC has two most prominent properties:
Property 1. Th e subject is less responsible for the action; in other words, its voli-
tionality (and hence overall agentivity) is decreased (cf. e.g., Ackerman, Moore 2001: 
141–157 and the references therein).1
Property 2. Th e decrease of agentivity is due to the fact that some external and 
irrational force acts on the subject (cf. e.g., Wierzbicka 1981). According to Ackerman 
and Moore (2001: 152), “the subject is causally aff ected”. Unfortunately, they do not 
explain how exactly the subject is aff ected – although it is intuitively clear that the 
subject of DRC is infl uenced in some more or less specifi c way, i.e. the external force 
causes the subject to have – or not to have – the relevant desires and energy. An external 
force causing the subject to feel fear, to feel lonely, angry, etc., would not reduce the 
subject referent’s agentivity. Whether a robber makes me raise my hands or I raise my 
hands of my own free will, whether I beat someone in a fi t of anger, or I do it in cold 
blood, in grammatical terms the level of my agentivity remains the same. 
One might argue (and I do so in Zeldovič 2011) that other properties of DRC 
(the subject is high in agentivity, normally human, hence the incoherence of ??Sobake 
1 By the term ‘subject’ I understand the semantic subject of the action, not the grammatical one. 
Ackerman and Moore argue convincingly that at least in Russian and Polish (where DRC is quite 
similar) the dative argument in DRC is not a full-fledged grammatical subject.
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ne begaetsja ‘the dog does not feel like running’; negation or a modifi er such as xorošo 
‘well’, ploxo ‘badly’ is needed in most cases, contrast ??Mne čitaetsja ‘I feel like reading’ 
and Mne ne čitaetsja, Mne ploxo čitaetsja ‘I do not feel like reading’; perfective verbs 
are mostly avoided, etc., as discussed, among others, in Gerritsen 1990) are derivative 
from Properties 1–2. But what about these Properties themselves? Are the notions of 
low responsibility and external force conventionally linked with DRC, or derivative 
from the meaning of its minor ‘parts’? Why should some external force attenuate the 
control of the subject over the event?
My answer is this: there is a clear ‘compositional’ motivation behind the above-
mentioned Properties. Property 1 is directly determined by the meaning of the refl exive 
marker and some additional circumstances to be presented later on, while Property 
2 follows from Property 1 in a regular, even if not transparent way.
2. The meaning of the reﬂ exive marker -sja in Russian: 
previous proposals
In the fi rst place, let us consider the meaning of the Russian refl exive marker -sja.2 
Th ree claims are most popular in the literature, each of which is questionable.
Claim 1. Th e postfi x -sja marks non-standard realization of arguments, e.g. 
the coreference of the agent and the patient in properly refl exive verbs (such as myt’sja 
‘to wash (oneself )’; as far as the non-refl exive myt’ is generally a two-place predicate, 
the reduction of one of its valencies is unordinary to some extent), the impossibility 
of the surface patient in the so-called agressives (Sobaka kusaetsja ‘the dog bites’), 
the impossibility of the surface agent in decausatives (such as Okno otkryvaetsja ‘the 
window opens’), the degraded status of the agent in passive (the agent stops to be 
an actant, becoming syntactically optional); see Babby 1975; Babby 1983; cf. also 
Israeli 1997: 42–43.
One problem with this claim is that in many cases non-standard diathesis is not 
marked by -sja: cf. the so-called absolutive use of transitive verbs, as in Ja gotovl’u ‘I 
am cooking’, which is extremely productive in many languages. Such verbs are often 
highly agentive, referring to some creation (cooking, writing, painting), and hence 
the absence of the patient undoubtedly ‘breaks the law’, but still remains unmarked. 
Th us, what Babby actually means is not any non-standard way of argument realization 
but only some non-standard ways, and the questions of which particular ways and of 
why it is so remain unanswered.
Furthermore, while Claim 1 is primarily intended to explain the Russian data, in 
the view of intuitive similarity between ‘light’ refl exive markers across languages, an 
explanation covering all or nearly all of the cross-linguistic facts is strongly prefer-
rable. In many languages refl exive markers are employed in impersonal sentences of 
2 What I say below holds true for ‘light’ reflexive markers in many languages, for instance the Polish 
się, and Spanish se. Although the rules of their use slightly differ across languages, their meaning 
seems to be the same. This view is adopted by the majority of authors, see, e.g., Hopper, Thompson 
1980; Arce-Arenales et al. 1994. For this reason, in the discussion below I will use some Polish and 
Spanish examples as additional (counter)evidence.
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the kind of the Polish Tam się jedzie przez most ‘One goes there by the bridge’, W ten 
sposób pisze się książki ‘Th is is the way books are written’. What does it follow from 
that in generic personal constructions such as Tam jadą przez most ‘Th ey go there by 
the bridge’, W ten sposób piszą książki ‘Th is is the way they write books’, which also 
lack a syntactic subject, no refl exive marker is needed?
One might argue that in impersonal constructions it is not a mere absence, but 
impossibility of the subject which is specially marked, but how, then, should we explain 
the absence of the refl exive marker in many other impersonal constructions?
So, under Babby’s approach the choice between refl exive and non-refl exive struc-
ture in the above discussed impersonal sentences remains unclear. On the other hand, 
this pattern is extremely productive in Polish, Spanish, Portuguese and many other 
languages, and thus Babby’s claim misses a very important generalization.
Next, in many refl exive verbs one fails to fi nd any deviation from, so to speak, 
diathetic standard altogether. For example, in such Russian ‘colour attenuatives’ as 
belet’sja ‘to appear white’, temnet’sja ‘to appear dark’. Th e number of arguments is not 
reduced by -sja, cf. the non-refl exives belet’ ‘to appear white’, temnet’ ‘to appear dark’.3 
Comparable examples can be found in other languages (cf. e.g., Zeldovič 2011 for 
discussion of Spanish material).
Claim 2. In refl exive verbs the subject is conceived of both as the starting and 
the terminal point of the relevant causal chain, i.e. it is in some sense or other 
object-like (Gerritsen 1990; Arce-Arenales et al. 1994). For example, in refl exives of 
the myt’sja ‘to wash (oneself )’-type the subject usually acts on himself, in passive it is 
by defi nion acted upon, and in agressives it is the object of characterization (Gerritsen 
1990: 99).
Still, this claim is also wrong for the above mentioned Polish, Spanish etc. imper-
sonal refl exive constructions, as well as for many anti-causative verbs, such as lit’sja ‘to 
pour’, vylivat’sja ‘to pour out’, otkryvat’sja ‘to open (by itself )’, zakryvat’sja ‘to shut (by 
itself )’, isparjat’sja ‘to evaporate’, etc., where the subject is often acted upon by some 
external force, but may also be thought of as initiating the action by itself.
Claim 3. Refl exive forms mark reduced transitivity, i.e. the situation is, as it 
were, less identifi able, less accessible to our mind (Hopper, Th ompson 1980).
Recall that in Hopper and Th ompson’s approach, transitivity is a manifold phe-
nomenon. Transitivity is higher where (a) the utterance has at least two participants, 
agent and direct object (in this case, transmission of force from A to DO typically 
occurs, which is in most cases easy to observe); (b) the situation is dynamic rather than 
static; (c) the situation is telic; (d) the situation is punctual; (e) the agent is volitional; 
(f ) the utterance is affi  rmative; (g) the modality is realis rather than irrealis; (h) the 
action is controllable; (i) the action aff ects the totality of the object; (j) the object is 
highly individuated, e.g., it is specifi c or defi nite.
Indeed, in many instances, including refl exives of the myt’sja ‘to wash (oneself )’-
type, the refl exive marker reduces the number of arguments, signals atelicity, as 
3 For an analysis of subtle differences between such reflexives and non-reflexives see Gerritsen 1980: 
40-42).
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illustrated in Hopper, Th ompson (1980: 278), stativizes the situation (recall con-
structions of the type of the Russian Sobaka kusaetsja ‘the dog bites’, which refer in 
the fi rst place to a property, not to an action; as is well known, passive constructions 
in general, and refl exive passive in particular, tend to be more stative than their 
active counterparts), attenuates the role of the subject (in DRC, for that matter), 
de-individualizes the object to some extent (for instance, in the Russian Sobaka 
kusaetsja ‘the dog beats’ the object is generalized), or indicates that object is only 
partially aff ected (the so-called oblique refl exives, cf. Russian vzjat’sja (za) ‘to grip 
(some part of the object)’).
Still, in spite of its intuitive appeal, this solution also encounters problems.
First, there are cases where the refl exive marker hardly reduces the overall transitiv-
ity. Consider the formation of Russian refl exives of the myt’sja ‘to wash (oneself )’-type 
(X moet Y(-a) ‘X washes Y’ => X moetsja ‘X washes (himself )’). While the number of 
arguments decreases here, object which can be animate or inanimate in X moet Y(-a) 
becomes necessarily animate in X moetsja, i.e. the degree of its individuation is higher, 
hence by criterion (j) transitivity is also higher. As a result, the infl uence of the refl exive 
marker on the degree of transitivity is twofold here, and it would be unmotivated to 
speak of its reduction.
Second, there exist even more transparent examples where the degree of transitivity 
is higher in the refl exive, cf. the Spanish verbs dormir ‘to sleep’ and dormirse ‘to fall 
asleep’, arder ‘to burn’ and arderse ‘to catch fi re’, where the refl exive predicate refers 
to an achievement, while the non-refl exive is stative, so that by criteria (b), (d) the 
former ones are more transitive.
Th ird, if the above mentioned ten criteria defi ning the degree of transitivity form 
a stable, non-accidental, and cross-linguistically recurrent set (which is the main tenet 
of the theory under discussion), one might expect at least some languages to use the 
refl exive marker also as a marker of counterfactuality and of negation (cf. criteria (g) 
and (f )). I am not aware of such a case.
3. The meaning of the reﬂ exive marker -sja in Russian: 
a novel proposal
Th e claim that I want to advance here is that the meaning of refl exive markers can 
be captured in terms of Dowty’s (1990) theory of agentive and patientive prototypes 
(cf. also Ackerman, Moore 2001).
In short, the refl exive marker signals that the highest ranked syntactic argument4 
is less agent-like, and/or more patient-like than the subject in the corresponding 
non-refl exive.
Th e agent and patient prototypes have the following properties:
4 Usually it is the subject proper, i.e. the subject in the nominative form, but other forms are also 
possible, for example dative subjects in DRC. 
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(1)  Agent proto-role:
 (a) A is volitional;
 (b) A is a sentient being;
 (c) A causes the event, most prominently causes changes in P;
 (d) A moves (relative to some other participant);
 (e) A exists independently of the situation referred to.
(2) Patient proto-role:
 (a) P undergoes changes;
 (b) P is incremental theme (i.e. serves for ‘measurement’ of action);
 (c) Some other participant causes changes in P;
 (d) P does not move;
 (e) P’s existence depends on the situation.
For the purposes at hand, it would be useful to extend the Dowtyian model in two 
respects.
First, although Dowty’s work focuses on transitive constructions, intransitive ones, 
including DRC, could well be treated in similar terms. All of the notions used in 
(1–2) are intuitively universal and hence prima facie must be important for intransi-
tive predications as well.5 
Second, Dowty assumes all of the relevant parameters to be binary, but at least one 
of them, namely volitionality, which will play a great role in forthcoming discussion, 
is certainly gradable, as also observed by Ackerman, Moore (2001).
My claim that the refl exive marker reduces agentivity and/or promotes patientiv-
ity is supported by the Russian refl exive verbs of the myt’sja ‘to wash (oneself )’-type 
and others, in which the agent also becomes a patient, by anti-causatives (where the 
causer, which is always higher in agentivity, is eliminated, and the patient occupies 
its place), by passive refl exives (in which the object which is less agentive becomes 
a subject), by the ‘refl exives of predisposition’ (such as the Russian bumaga rvetsja 
‘the paper tears’, where, as it were, the object, hence more patient-like participant, 
becomes the subject), by reciprocals (here the agent becomes also a patient to some 
extent; thus, if Ivan celujuetsja s Mariej ‘Ivan and Mary kiss’, Ivan is both the agent 
(the one who kisses), and the patient (the one kissed)), etc.
To take less obvious examples, consider Sobaka kusaetsja ‘the dog bites’, where the 
dog becomes an object of characterization, and thus also more patientive (Gerritsen 
1990: 99).
In such instances as the Polish Tam się jedzie przez most ‘One goes there by the 
bridge’, W ten sposób pisze się książki ‘Th is is the way books are written’, no mat-
ter whether the subject disappears here or it is the refl exive marker się which is the 
subject (the opportunity hard to believe in), the subject looses its independent exist-
ence as compared to commensurable constructions with “ordinary”, even if generic 
subjects.
5 Recall that there is no sharp devide between transitive and intransitive constructions, see e.g. Hopper, 
Thompson 1982.
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Th e point is that generic personal sentences are systematically polysemous between 
a generic and a specifi c meaning. Th us, the Polish sentences Tam jadą przez most ‘Th ey 
go there by the bridge’, W ten sposób piszą książki ‘Th is is the way they write books’, 
as well as the Spanish constructions Aquí duerme la gente ‘Th ey sleep here’, lit. ‘Peo-
ple sleep here’, or the Russian Spjat u nas na čerdake ‘In our house, they sleep in the 
attic’, may refer to a specifi c group of people (say, the people living in such-and-such 
district, people belonging to such-and-such family, etc). Th is indicates that possible 
vacillation between strictly generic and non-generic construal is due to a vagueness of 
the meaning of relevant sentences, not to their ambiguity. Th at is to say, the generic-
ity of the subject and hence the lack of independent existence thereof is a matter of 
context, not a regular property of such constructions.
On the other hand, for impersonal refl exive constructions under discussion the 
generic interpretation is the only possible one, which defi nitely deprives the subject 
of independent existence.6 
One might argue that in impersonal constructions it is not a mere absence, but 
impossibility of the subject which is specially marked, but how, then, should we explain 
the absence of the refl exive marker in many other impersonal constructions?7
4. Why -sja in DRC reduces volitionality: general 
remarks
It follows from what has been said that the addition of the refl exive marker can reduce 
the agentivity of the subject, and that the relevant diff erence between the non-refl exive 
(NRC) and refl exive construction (RC) may be of six kinds:
 (a)  in NRC volitionality is higher, in RC lower;
 (b)  in NRC the event is volitional – in RC it is non-volitional, or its volition-
ality is optional;
 (c)  in NRC the subject is sentient – in RC it is non-sentient, or its sentience 
is optional;
 (d)  in NRC the subject is the causer of the event – in RC it is not necessarily 
so;
 (e)  in NRC the subject moves – its movement is not implied by RC;
 (f )  in NRC the existence of the subject is independent of the situation referred 
to – in RC it is or may be dependent.
If, however, we ask which of these options is pragmatically more accessible, it becomes 
immediately clear that it is the fi rst one.
Indeed, it is only half-heartedly that we regard two situations as identical if one of 
them arises due to a volitional action of its subject, and the other does not (cf. ??John 
and Mary both broke a vase, John intentionally, Mary accidentally; many authors even 
tend to treat such uses of a verb as distinct lexemes), and it is practically impossible to 
6 True enough, sometimes such constructions are used with reference to a specific subject, but this is 
a stylistic device, a kind of ostentative avoidance of direct nomination; see Christensen 1995.
7 For extensive discussion of more complicated examples demonstrating that the reflexive marker signals 
reduced agentivity and/or increased patientivity of the subject, see Zeldovič 2011, Chapter II.2.
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deem identical a situation where the subject must be sentient, and a situation where it 
need not be so; a situation where the subject necessarily causes the event, and a situa-
tion where it does not; a situation where the subject necessarily moves and a situation 
where its movement is unnecessary; a situation where the subject has its independent 
existence, and a situation where it has not.
On the other hand, as far as vilitionality is a gradable phenomenon, an event for 
whose occurrence the subject is somewhat more responsible, and an event in which 
that participant’s role in the event’s taking place is lower can be readily regarded as the 
same type of action, as the following well-formed sentence illustrates: John and Mary 
both washed their dishes; however, John did it reluctantly, Mary eagerly.
Th erefore, if option (a) is chosen, the conceptual distance between NRC and RC is 
shorter, hence where the refl exive marker is taken to signal the reduction of agentivity, 
it would most readily be interpreted as the marker of lower volitionality.8
Furthermore, one might argue that the most natural way to reduce volitionality 
in DRC is to conceive of the subject as owing its desires and resources to an external 
irrational force.
5. Why -sja in DRC reduces volitionality: speciﬁ c remarks
To see this, let us fi rst specify the notion of volitionality assumed here.
It is usually believed that action is volitional if it is due to free choice of the subject 
(cf. Ackerman, Moore 2001: 30).
Imagine, however, a situation where John is incapable of any physical action but 
capable of wishing, and someone else has immediate access to his wishes (e.g. telepathi-
cally) and fulfi ls them. Are we entitled to say in such circumstances that John built 
a house, sent a letter, etc.? Th e answer is no: beyond volition, some deed is needed: at 
the very least, John should have said something, or move his lips, or wink, etc. Hence, 
volitionality presupposes some inner resources.
In other words, an action is volitional, where the following is true: if the agent acts, 
it is due to his free choice, and to the fact that he has requisite inner resources.
Admittedly, the borderline between volitional and non-volitional situations is 
somewhat blurred. Consider such ‘demi-volitional’ verbs as spat’ ‘to sleep’, zevat’ ‘to 
yawn’, čixat’ ‘to sneeze’, plakat’ ‘to cry’, vsplaknut’ ‘to cry (for a while, a little)’, toskovat’ 
‘be in sorrow’. On the one hand, such situations are normally not due to the subject’s 
choice, and hence, if we follow the Dowtyian style of thinking and take into account 
only those senses necessarily implied by the verb, such verbs would not be regarded 
as volitional.
On the other hand, we should somehow accommodate the intuition that in all of 
these cases the responsibility of the subject can be higher or lower, since sometimes 
8 Note that I do not claim that such a reflexive marker always implies a lower volitionality, which is 
factually untrue (see again Zeldovič 2011, Chapter II.2). What I mean here is that there must exist 
and must be ‘easily accessible’ a construction where the reflexive marker is interpreted as a marker 
of a lower volitionality – and this construction is DRC.
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this participant can intentionally inhibit the situation. For instance, if John was put 
to sleep with the help of a strong sleeping pill, he is most certainly not responsible for 
his sleeping, but under normal circumstances one feeling sleepy can choose between 
sleeping and non-sleeping, one feeling like yawning or sneezing can at least try not 
to yawn or sneeze, etc.
Th is means that the volitionality of the verbs in question can be reduced practically 
in the same way as the volitionality of ‘full-fl edged’ volitional verbs, which explains 
the free occurrence of demi-volitional verbs in DRC.
6. Why an irrational external force?
Now let us turn to the main issue: why should the reduction of volitionality in DRC 
be tantamount to the appearance of an irrational external force ‘providing’ the subject 
with its wishes and inner resources?
Generally speaking, once we assume that the subject of DRC is lower in volitional-
ity, two possibilities are open.
First, the fact that our desires and resources are gradable could be exploited, and 
the decrease of volitionality could mean that the subject has less desire and/or inner 
resources necessary for the action to be performed.
Second, we can think of the desires and inner resources of the subject as if they 
were dependent on some external circumstances, i.e. as if their existence were caused 
by some irrational external force. As I will show later on, where we say that such a force 
exists, we strongly tend to conceive of the relevant situation as realized or at least very 
probable, i.e. in this case the subject looses much of its freedom.
Note that in the fi rst case, the refl exive construction would diff er from the cor-
responding non-refl exive one only in quantitative terms, and in the second case the 
diff erence would be of a qualitative nature.
However, the realization of the fi rst possibility would lead to drastic inconsistencies, 
and for this reason it is the second one that must be realized in refl exive constructions 
reducing the volitionality of the subject.
As follows from what has been said, the acceptance of the fi rst possibility is 
tantamount to the claim that in the opposition “refl exive construction reducing the 
volitionality of the subject (DRC) – the relevant non-refl exive construction” a quanti-
tative, not a qualitative sense is grammaticalized. However, it is only qualitative senses 
that tend to grammaticalize.
Skipping the discussion of the grammatical categories for which this is obviously 
true (such as gender, tense, person, mood, voice), let us consider several less transpar-
ent examples.
Number. Th e diff erence between singular and plural is partly qualitative, since one 
entity is the necessary minimum for the relevant situation to obtain and to be thought 
of, while more than one is not necessary. In other words, thinking of a ‘singular’ thing 
is a necessary condition for the relevant conceptualization, whereas thinking of a set 
of things of the same kind is not. Obviously, the diff erence between necessary and 
non-necessary conditions is a qualitative one.
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Even more importantly, it has been argued that our concepts of singularity and 
plurality are not in the least symmetrical, only one of them (most certainly plurality) 
having its own ‘substance’ and the other one (in all probability, that of singularity) 
being semantically ‘void’ (cf. Farkas, de Swart 2010 for discussion). Arguably, also the 
diff erences between singular and dual, as well as between dual and plural are qualitative.
Grammatical aspect. Th e opposition ‘perfective aspect – imperfective aspect’ 
in Russian9 turns out to be qualitative regardless of whether we adopt the popular 
interpretation of aspect as a means of indicating that the event is completed/not 
completed, link the aspectual choice to ‘inceptivity’ or lack thereof (in which case the 
qualitative nature of the distinction is evident), or treat aspect the way I advocate in 
Zeldovič 2002; Zeldovič 2011.
My claim is that the perfective aspect presents the situation as – in some sense or 
other – singular, while imperfective as iterative or at least potentially repeatable. As 
I said above, the distinction between ‘one’ and ‘many’ is qualitative. Furthermore, for 
reasons explained in the above-mentioned research, in the realis domain the perfective 
aspect practically never signals, as it were, ‘pure’, ‘unmixed’ singularity: for instance, 
in the past the sense ‘the presence or absence of the result is important at the time 
of speech’ usually arises, in the future perfective verbs attract attention to the situa-
tion which immediately follows the speech event, etc. In irrealis contexts, by contrast, 
perfective verbs tend to be neutral, but their imperfective counterparts systematically 
develop specifi c shades of meaning; e.g., the so-called ‘potential’ imperfectives, i.e. 
imperfectives referring to some potentiality additionally suggest that the possible ac-
tion has indeed taken place at some time, or most probably at several diff erent times 
(thus, while utterance Ona svarit francuzskij sup ‘she can cook a French soup’, liter-
ally ‘she will cook a French soup’, with the perfective svarit is appropriate, even if the 
person in question has never cooked this kind of soup previously, utterance Ona varit 
francuzskij sup ‘she can cook a French soup’, literally ‘she cooks a French soup’ always 
presupposes that this person did so, and most certainly many times).
Th us, the opposition between grammatical aspects cannot be captured in purely 
quantitative terms.
Case. It goes without saying that the key case oppositions, in the fi rst place that 
between the nominative normally used for agents and the accusative normally referring 
to patients, are qualitative in the above defi ned sense: the agent is the initial, while the 
patient is non-initial point in the relevant causal chain (cf., a.o., Croft 1991).
It might well seem that the diff erence between the fi rst object and the second ob-
ject could be treated as quantitative, because the latter is undoubtedly less aff ected by 
the action: consider such much-discussed examples as We loaded the hay on the truck, 
We loaded the truck with hay. Still, as Dowty (1991) showed, it is the participant in 
the situation that has more of the above listed properties of the ‘ideal’ patient that 
becomes the direct object, while for indirect objecthood the participant with fewer 
9 I confine myself to Russian, since the discussion of other aspectual systems would lead us very far 
astray.
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properties is chosen. On the other hand, every property comprised by the prototype 
of the patient is uncontroversially qualitative in character.10
Th e same holds true of the opposition between the accusative direct object and 
genitive direct object in Russian negative sentences, which might appear as quantita-
tive. If the accusative indicates that the object is in some sense less prominent (see 
Timberlake 1975; Klenin 1980, among many others), does it mean that it diff ers from 
the genitive only in terms of quantity? Th e answer is no, for the following reasons. 
First, the genitive occurs instead of the accusative, but the accusative in itself is not 
in the least marked for prominence. On the one hand, intuitively it is not marked in 
positive sentences, and the analysis of negative ones is welcome, which keeps these 
types symmetrical. On the other hand, in the general case the accusative object may 
well be used both for high- and low-prominent participants. In spite of what many 
authors write, such an object can be both referentially defi nite and indefi nite; cf. Ja 
ne uvidel noviznu etoj raboty – nikakoj novizny tam net ‘I failed to see the noveltyacc. 
of the work – there is no novelty to it’; Nikakuju knigu ja na stole ne videl: v komnate 
voobšče net knig ‘I saw no bookacc. on the desk: there are no books in the room’. True 
enough, accusative objects tend to be defi nite, or at least to be used with reference 
to already mentioned entities, but this tendency is explainable by division of labor 
between accusative object and genitive object, which always signals that its referent 
is less salient, and hence in all probability indefi nite and not previously mentioned. 
Th us, here the relation between the two cases is asymmetric: only the genitive conveys 
some specifi c information concerning the salience of the relevant entity. 
Second, as A. Timberlake convincingly argues, the genitive marking of the direct 
object is determined by several undoubtedly ‘qualitative’ factors, such as indefi nite-
ness, plurality, inanimacy, lack of modifi cation, etc.11
It follows from the discussion so far that even seemingly strong candidates for 
‘quantitative’ grammatical oppositions on closer inspection prove to be (at least 
partly) qualitative.
Against this background, the claim that dative refl exive constructions signal 
only that the subject’s desires and/or inner resources are reduced is counterintuitive. 
Furthermore, if we accept this claim, another inconsistency that is hard to overcome 
arises. Recall that the meaning we ascribe to DRC is ‘the subject has relatively little 
desire and/or inner resources’. However, the notion ‘little’ is always rhematic (Zeldovič 
1999). To see this, consider the example in (3):
(3)  Ja verju (dumaju, nadejus’), čto v čajnike malo vody
 ‘I believe (think, hope), there is little water in the kettle’,
where it is the small quantity of water that becomes the object of belief or hope.
10 Things do not change if we opt for some other view of argument realization. Thus, according to 
Croft (1991), the subject and the direct object differ from other participants in that they serve for 
identification of the situation. Thus, the difference between the direct object and the indirect object 
once again turns out to be qualitative.
11 A very similar picture is to be found in Russian genitive subjects, see Zeldovič 2011.
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If this sense in DRC is rhematic, the negation of DRC would mean that the 
subject has not little desire and/or inner resources, which contradicts the very nature 
of DRC, whose basic meaning – whatever the concrete explanation of its origin – is 
uncontroversially the reduction of volitionality.
Our third counterargument is as follows.
Recall demi-volitional verbs, such as spat’ ‘to sleep’, zevat’ ‘to yawn’, čixat’ ‘to 
sneeze’, plakat’ ‘to cry’, vsplaknut’ ‘to cry (for a while, a little)’, toskovat’ ‘be in sorrow’. 
Th e eventualities they refer to may be completely independent of the subject’s choice 
(Spal i ne mog prosnut’sja ‘He slept and could not wake up’), or may to some extent 
be dependent on the subject’s choice, as when the subject can prevent the situation, 
but for some reasons chooses not to do so.
Th e point is that demi-volitional verbs are freely used in DRCs: DRCs signal 
the ‘helplessness’ of the subject, while corresponding personal constructions leave it 
unspecifi ed whether the subject was helpless, or willingly refrained from taking any 
action. Note that in the pairs in (4)–(5) the indication of the freedom of will of the 
subject is in place only when the non-refl exive construction is involved:
(4) a.  Ona gor’ko plakala. I ne xotela ostanovit’sja.
  ‘She cried bitterly. And she did not wish to stop’
 b.  ??Ej gor’ko plakalos’. I ona ne xotela ostanovit’sja.
  ‘She felt like crying bitterly. And she did not wish to stop’.
(5)  a.  On toskoval i toskoval. Mog sbrosit’ s sebja tosku, no ne xotel.
  ‘He was in sorrow. He could shed his sorrows, but he would not.’
 b.  ??Emu toskovalos’ i toskovalos’. Mog sbrosit’ s sebja tosku, no ne xotel.
  ‘He felt like being in sorrow. He could shed his sorrows, but he would 
not’.
Th erefore, on the one hand, where demi-volitional verbs show up in DRC, the clearly 
qualitative change: ‘the subject could prevent the action – the subject could not’ oc-
curs. Still, the fact that demi-volitional verbs are freely used in DRC and that, intui-
tively, this change is not diff erent from what happens to ‘normal’ volitional verbs in 
DRC, also suggest that the reduction of volitionality in DRC is always due to some 
qualitative shift.
7. If the shift in the degree of volitionality in DRC as 
compared to personal constructions is a qualitative one, 
what is this shift and how is it triggered?
Recall that an event is volitional, when the following is true: if the agent acts, it is due to his 
free choice, and to the fact that he has requisite inner resources. Th erefore, if volitionality 
is some sort of causal relation, and DRC serves to modify this relation (as compared to 
the corresponding non-refl exive construction), it might be expected that, in general, 
the employment of DRC makes the causal relations into which the relevant situation 
enters more salient, more interesting to the speaker. Th us, abstractly speaking, it may 
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well be that the reduction of volitionality occurs due to some restructurization or 
reinterpretation of relevant causal chains. I think, this is actually the case.
Let us start with the most obvious. First, every situation, among others the situations 
‘the subject wishes to do something’, ‘the subject has inner resources for doing so’ has 
its cause. Second, this cause can be known to the speaker, and can be unknown to him.
What sets our desires and inner resources apart from the most of other things is 
that their cause is hard to establish.
If we speak of some concrete, ‘palpable’ event, there seems to be nothing special 
about saying that we know, or understand its cause.
Note the following facts. First, both saying that we know/understand the cause 
and saying that we do not know/understand it sounds here equally natural. Second, 
saying that we know, or understand the cause of some event, we mean exactly what we 
say – that we are in possession of some knowledge. Th ird, – and this is undoubtedly 
a consequence of the previous circumstance – this sort of knowledge is easy to impart.
Th us, in examples (6)–(8) the “positive” variant (a) sounds no less natural than 
the “negative” (b), and it is knowledge in the strict sense of the word that is involved 
both in (a) and (b). As versions (c) demonstrate, it could readily be imparted, and 
from versions (d) it is immediately clear that the impossibility of imparting such 
a knowledge is practically unthinkable.
(6) a.  Mne ponjatno, počemu Ivan uvolilsja.
  ‘It is clear to me why Ivan gave up his work’
 b.  Mne neponjatno, počemu Ivan uvolilsja
  ‘It is unclear to me why Ivan gave up his work’
 c.  Mne ponjatno, počemu Ivan uvolilsja, i ja mogu vam ob’jasnit’.
  ‘It is clear to me why Ivan gave up his work, and I can explain it to you’
 d.  ??Mne ponjatno, počemu Ivan uvolilsja, no ja ne mogu vam xorošo 
ob’jasnit’
  ‘It is clear to me why Ivan gave up his work, but I cannot explain it well 
to you’
(7) a. Mne jasno, počemu Ivan eto napisal.
  ‘It is clear to me why Ivan wrote that’
 b.  Mne nejasno, počemu Ivan eto napisal.
  ‘It is unclear to me why Ivan wrote that’
 c.  Mne jasno, počemu Ivan eto napisal, i ja mogu vam rasskazat’.
  ‘It is clear to me why Ivan wrote that, and I can tell you’
 d.  ??Mne jasno, počemu Ivan eto napisal, no slovami etogo ne skazat’.
  ‘It is clear to me why Ivan wrote that, but one cannot tell it in words’
(8) a. – Ty znaeš’, počemu on ušel ot ženy?
  ‘Do you know why he left his wife?’
  – Otlično znaju.
  ‘I know perfectly well’
 b.  – Ty znaeš’, počemu on ušel ot ženy?
  ‘Do you know why he left his wife?’
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  – Ponjatija ne imeju.
  ‘I have no idea’
 c.  Ja otlično znaju, počemu on ušel ot ženy, i mogu vam ob’jasnit’
  ‘I know perfectly well why he left his wife, and I can explain it to you’
 d.  ?Ja otlično znaju, počemu on ušel ot ženy, no etogo ne ob’jasnit’ slo-
vami.
  ‘I know perfectly well why he left his wife, but it cannot be explained in 
words’
On the other hand, when we say we know/understand why someone has such and 
such desires or inner resources, our utterance becomes distinctly marked. First, it is 
slightly more natural to say we do not know or understand the reason than to assert 
that we know or understand it. Th us, in examples (9)–(11) below the “positive” variant 
(a) is a bit less likely to appear in our everyday speech than the “negative” (b).
(9) a.  Mne vpolne ponjatno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily, čtoby) pisat’ knigu.
  ‘It is clear to me where Ivan’s desire (necessary energy) to write the book 
comes from’
 b.  Mne sovsem neponjatno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily, čtoby) pisat’ 
knigu.
  ‘It is absolutely unclear to me where Ivan’s desire (energy necessary) to 
write the book comes from’
 c.  ?Mne vpolne ponjatno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily, čtoby) pisat’ knigu, 
i ja mogu vam eto ob’jasnit’
  ‘It is clear to me where Ivan’s desire (energy necessary) to write the book 
comes from, and I can explain it to you’
 d.  !Mne vpolne ponjatno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily, čtoby) pisat’ knigu, 
no eto slovami ne ob’jasnit’
  ‘It is clear to me where Ivan’s desire (energy necessary) to write the book 
comes from, but it cannot be explained in words’
(10) a.  Mne jasno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily) dumat’ o rabote
  ‘It is clear to me where Ivan’s desire (energy necessary) to think of his 
work comes from’
 b.  Mne nejasno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily) dumat’ o rabote
  ‘It is unclear to me where Ivan’s desire (necessary energy) to think of his 
work comes from’
 c.  ?Mne jasno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily) dumat’ o rabote, i ja mogu vam 
ob etom rasskazat’
  ‘It is clear to me where Ivan’s desire (energy necessary) to think of his 
work comes from, and I can tell you about that’
 d.  !Mne jasno, otkuda u Ivana želanie (sily) dumat’ o rabote, no takie vešči 
slovami inogda ne ob’jasnit’
  ‘It is clear to me where Ivan’s desire (energy necessary) to think of his work 
comes from, but sometimes you could not explain such things in words’
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(11) a.  – Ty znaeš’, gde Ivan vzjal sily, čtoby ujti ot ženy?
  ‘Do you know what encouraged Ivan to leave his wife?’
  – Otlično znaju
  ‘I know it perfectly well’
 b.  – Ty znaeš’, gde Ivan vzjal sily, čtoby ujti ot ženy?
  ‘Do you know what encouraged Ivan to leave his wife?’
  – Ponjatija ne imeju
  ‘I have no idea’
 c.  – Ty znaeš’, gde Ivan vzjal sily, čtoby ujti ot ženy?
  ‘Do you know what encouraged Ivan to leave his wife?’
  – ?Otlično znaju – i mogu vam eto ob’jasnit’
  ‘I know perfectly well, and I can explain it to you’
 d.  – Ty znaeš’, gde Ivan vzjal sily, čtoby ujti ot ženy?
  ‘Do you know what encouraged Ivan to leave his wife?’
  – !Otlično znaju, no edva li smogu vam eto ob’jasnit’
  ‘I know perfectly well, but I could hardly explain it to you’
Even more crucial is the fact that while in negative utterances, speaking about the 
lack of knowledge/understanding, we indeed mean lack thereof, in the positive 
ones such expressions as I know, I understand on closer inspection turn out to be 
near synonyms to I guess, I feel, I have such and such impressions, etc. For instance, 
saying something like I know/understand the source of John’s inspiration: he has fallen 
in love we more often than not refer to some kind of partial understanding, or even 
to mere guesswork. Th us, it is most certainly some impressions, not knowledge 
as such that are involved in (9a)–(11a). On the other hand, what the “negative” 
utterances (9b)–(11b) tell us about is uncontroversially not impressions, but the 
lack of knowledge.
To sum up, here in the negative variants words mean exactly what they mean, or at 
the very least are much closer to their canonical, literal meaning than in the positive 
variants – which is indicative of their marked nature.
Last but not least, as the slightly bizarre examples (9c)–(11c) and, conversely, the 
impeccable examples (9d)–(11d) show, the mental attitude referred to in (9a)–(11a) 
is often hard to impart, which is unnatural in the case of actual knowledge. Th is fact 
lends additional support to the claim that it is not knowledge or understanding as 
such that we face in (9a)–(11a) and that such constructions are marked and, hence, 
pragmatically less accessible than their negative counterparts.
It should also be noted that regardless the detail with which we present the 
rational, obvious reasons why someone would and could do something, there al-
ways remains room for some additional ununderstood causes. Th us, (12) is almost 
contradictory:
(12) Ivanu tak xočetsja pisat’ potomu, čto davno ne pisal, i potomu, čto u nego 
sozrevaet novyj zamysel. ??Vpročem, nel’zja skazat’, čto želanie voznikaet 
u Ivana takže pod vozdejstviem kakoj-to nejasnoj postoronnej sily
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‘Ivan feels like writing so much because he has not written since a long time ago 
and because he has a new idea that is beginning to take shape. ??However, it is not true 
that Ivan’s desire arises because some unclear external force acts upon him’.
To sum up, whenever we look for the source of the subject’s desires and inner 
resources, the idea that the speaker fails to recognize this source is pragmatically more 
salient and more readily available than the opposite, i.e. that the speaker knows this 
source. Th us, when interpreting dative refl exive constructions we are ready to think 
that the subject has his desires and inner resources because he is acted upon by some 
external irrational force. What is more, if we think this way, the volitionality of the 
subject is automatically reduced.
To see this, consider fi rst the following examples:
(13) a.  Volnenie pobuždalo Ivana pisat’, no on ne naxodil nužnyx slov
  ‘Agitation made Ivan write, but he failed to choose the right words’
 b. ?Neponjatnaja sila pobuždala Ivana pisat’, no on ne naxodil nužnyx slov
  ‘An unknown force made Ivan write, but he failed to choose the right 
words’
(14) a.  Posle dolgogo otpuska Ivanu hotelos’ rabotat’, no rabotat’ emu zapretili
  ‘After the long vacation Ivan was eager to work, but he had no permission 
to work’
 b.  ?Nejasnaja sila vlekla Ivana k rabote, no rabotat’ emu zapretili
  ‘Some unclear force pushed Ivan to work, but he had no permission to 
work’
(15) a.  Posle otpuska u Ivana pojavilis’ sily pisat’, no on rešil zanjat’sja drugimi 
delami
  ‘After the vacations Ivan had the energy for writing, but he chose to do 
other things’
 b.  ??Neizvestno otkuda u Ivana pojavilis’ sily pisat’, no on rešil zanjat’sja 
drugimi delami
  ‘For some unknown reason, Ivan had the energy for writing, but he chose 
to do other things’
(16) a.  Ot vodki vdrug pojavilsja kuraž, no ne było vozmožnosti dat’ emu vyxod
  ‘After drinking vodka, he felt brave, but there was no outlet for his energy’
 b. ?Neizvestno otkuda pojavilsja kuraž, no ne było vozmožnosti dat’ emu 
vyxod
  ‘Out of nowhere, a courage appeared, but there was no outlet for his energy’
From examples (b) it appears that speaking of unclear source of the energy and desire 
is fi ne, only where the relevant action is actually (at least partly) performed, not merely 
intended.
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In other words, once we employ some special construction indicating that the 
subject’s desires and/or inner resources are due to an irrational external force, we 
limit the subject’s free will, we reduce his responsibility and hence his volitionality.12
Th e same holds true of demi-volitional verbs, i.e. verbs referring to a situation which 
arises ‘by itself ’ and not due to the subject’s intention, but which, in principle, could 
be prevented by the subject: spat’ ‘to sleep’, zevat’ ‘to yawn’, čixat’ ‘to sneeze’, plakat’ ‘to 
cry’, vsplaknut’ ‘to cry (for a while, a little)’, toskovat’ ‘be in sorrow’, etc.
If we conceive of the subject as being acted upon by some irrational external force, 
it is harder to believe that the subject could (intentionally) refrain from the relevant 
action.
As for the pragmatic accessibility of such a notion, it is even higher than in the 
case of ‘ordinary’, full-fl edged agentive verbs, since what is unclear here is not why 
the subject has some intentions and/or inner resources but why he does not have the 
intention and/or resources necessary for preventing some action, and since the rea-
sons for the lack of something tend to be unknown more strongly than the reasons 
for its presence.
Examples (17)–(19) below show that it is natural not to see the reason for some-
one’s crying, being in sorrow, etc., and examples (20)–(22) show how uncomfortably 
we feel when someone claims to understand the reasons:
(17) Ty znaeš’, otčego ona grustit (plačet), kogda nado radovat’sja?
 ‘Do you know why she is in sorrow (is crying), when she should be happy?’
 – Ponjatija ne imeju
 ‘I have no idea’
(18)  – Ty znaeš’, otčego on spit, kogda emu na rabotu?
 ‘Do you know, why he is sleeping, when he should go to work?’
 – Ne znaju
 ‘I do not know’
(19)  – Ty znaeš’, otčego on podumal, čto ja ego obmanyvaju?
 ‘Do you know, why he thought I was deceiving him?’
 – Ponjatija ne imeju
 ‘I have no idea’
(20) – Ty znaeš’, otčego ona grustit (plačet), kogda nado radovat’sja?
 ‘Do you know why she is in sorrow (is crying), when she should be happy?’
 – ??Da, točno znaju
 ‘Yes, I know exactly’
12 Admittedly, this happens on the level of our conceptualization, but this is exactly the level where 
such phenomena as agentivity and patientivity belong. Recall such well-known examples as John 
helped me very much with his letter, John’s letter helped me very much, where, factually, John is in both 
cases an agent, but linguistically only in the former one he is agentive. Russian Kon’ umer ot starosti 
‘the horse died from age’, Starost’ ubila konja ‘the age killed the horse’ are of the same type: in the 
long run, kon’ ‘the horse’ is patient-like in both cases, but while in the latter it is overtly marked for 
patientivity, in the former it seems to be an actor, the participant in some way or other responsible 
for what happended.
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(21)  – Ty znaeš’, otčego on spit, kogda emu na rabotu?
 ‘Do you know, why he is sleeping, when he should go to work?’
 – ??Da, točno znaju
 ‘Yes, I know exactly’
 (22) – Ty znaeš’, otčego on podumal, čto ja ego obmanyvaju?
 ‘Do you know, why he thought I was deceiving him?’
 – ??Da, točno znaju
 ‘Yes, I know exactly’
From what has been said it is mmediately clear why the subject of DRC with demi-
volitional verbs is completely ‘helpless’, as examples (4)–(5) repeated below for con-
venience show:
(4) a.  Ona gor’ko plakala. I ne xotela ostanovit’sja.
  ‘She cried bitterly. And she did not wish to stop’
 b.  ??Ej gor’ko plakalos’. I ona ne xotela ostanovit’sja.
  ‘She felt like crying bitterly. And she did not wish to stop.’
(5)  a.  On toskoval i toskoval. Mog sbrosit’ s sebja tosku, no ne xotel.
  ‘He was in sorrow. He could shed his sorrows, but he would not.’
 b.  ??Emu toskovalos’ i toskovalos’. Mog sbrosit’ s sebja tosku, no ne xotel.
  ‘He felt like being in sorrow. He could shed his sorrows, but he would not’.
8. Why dative subject?
Now the last question remains: why a shift from nominative to dative case occurs in DRC?
Th e answer in quite straightforward. According to Croft (1991) and other works, 
we tend to use nominative case for the participant being the initial point of the relevant 
causal chain. However, in DRC the subject is not the initial point: this role is served 
by an irrational external force, the subject being rather some kind of benefactive, and 
thus the most appropriate case is dative. 
9. Conclusion
To sum up, if we agree that the refl exive postfi x -sja is an indicator of relatively low 
agentivity and/or high patientivity, one of its interpretation is ‘the subject is less 
volitional’, which is most readily construed as ‘the subject is acted upon by an ir-
rational external force’, which leads to nominative-to-dative change of the subject’s 
morphological marking.
Th us, the most prominent properties of dative refl exive constructions can be 
explained in a compositional way, which helps to reduce the number of grammati-
cal entities and makes it clear why dative refl exive constructions are so similar across 
languages.13
13 For explanation of ‘secondary’ properties of DRC see Zeldovič 2011.
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